Games and Society
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Summary
Editor's review
Who it's for
A good fit for
- 经济学、社会学、政治学、法学等社科专业的学生,需要一本不依赖高等数学的博弈论入门
- 对「人为什么不合作」「制度为何失效」等社会问题有好奇心的普通读者
- 企业管理者和公共事务从业者,希望用博弈视角理解激励机制与规则设计
- 读过张维迎其他著作,想系统了解其制度与合作思想的读者
Not a good fit for
- 需要严格数学推导、定理证明和习题训练的研究型读者,可改看专门教材
- 只想速成「谈判技巧」「职场博弈术」的实用型读者,本书更偏理论分析
- 期待本书讨论具体政策方案或行业操作细节的读者
Reading tips
- 先读第一至六章打基础,纳什均衡与囚徒困境两章是理解全书的关键。
- 每章末尾的「本章提要」可以先看,带着框架再回读正文,效率更高。
- 读完一章后,试着用书中的概念分析一则当天新闻或身边的合作难题。
- 若想继续深造,可接着读作者的《博弈论与信息经济学》或《博弈与社会讲义》。
About the publisher
Peking University Press is a comprehensive university press whose publishing areas cover classical literature, popular science, social culture, world history, Western philosophy, and culture. Its catalogue contains 6,031 titles, with representative books including A Dream of Red Mansions, Relativity: The Special and General Theory (15th Edition) (with Einstein's classic papers on unified field theory and other topics), Elements, Conics, The Aristocratic Families of the Eastern Jin, The Philosophy of Mythology (Volume I), The Philosophy of Mythology (Volume II), and The Origin of Continents and Oceans. Representative authors include Cao Xueqin, Zhou Ruchang, Albert Einstein, Euclid, Apollonius, Tian Yuqing, Schelling, and Xian Gang. The press has developed distinctive strengths in classical Chinese literature and in the translation of Western philosophical classics, while also covering scientific classics and social and cultural studies. As public information is limited, this description is based only on the books in the catalogue and offers no further extrapolation.
Contents
- Chapter 1 Introduction: Individual Rationality and Social Optimality
- Chapter 2 Nash Equilibrium and the Prisoner's Dilemma Game
- Chapter 3 Multiple Equilibria, Institutions, and Culture
- Chapter 4 Threats and Promises
- Chapter 5 Bargaining and Patience
- Chapter 6 Repeated Games and Cooperative Behavior
- Chapter 7 Incomplete Information and Reputation
- Chapter 8 Adverse Selection, Brands, and Government Regulation
- Chapter 9 Signaling and Social Norms
- Chapter 10 Mechanism Design and Income Distribution
- Chapter 11 Moral Hazard and Corruption
- Chapter 12 Evolutionary Games and Spontaneous Order
- Chapter 13 Law and Social Norms
- Chapter 14 Institutional Entrepreneurs and Confucian Social Norms
- References
- Index of Names
FAQ
读这本书需要数学基础吗?
《博弈与社会》和《博弈与社会讲义》是同一本书吗?
这本书主要讲了什么核心观点?
这本书适合当教材使用吗?
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About the author
Zhang Weiying, born in 1959 in Wubu, Shaanxi, is a professor of economics at Peking University's Guanghua School of Management, where he previously served as dean. He earned his bachelor's and master's degrees in economics from Northwest University and later received his doctorate in economics from Oxford University. He was among the first scholars in China to systematically argue for dual-track price reform. His research spans enterprise theory, property rights and governance, information and trust, and law and economics. His major works include The Entrepreneur of the Firm: A Contract Theory, Enterprise Theory and China's Enterprise Reform, and Understanding the Firm: Property Rights, Incentives, and Governance. Combining theoretical depth with practical concern, he analyzes firms, markets, and institutions from an economic perspective and also addresses the public on entrepreneurship and social culture, influencing readers in management, law, and finance.