Power Structure, Political Incentives and Economic Growth: A Political Economy Analysis Based on Zhejiang's Private Economy Development Experience (Contemporary Economics Series)

章奇Truth & Wisdom Press · ChinaAug 2020

Rating 4.2
Word count
195K words
Chapters
41
ISBN
9787543223714

Tags

Finance and Economics Institutional AnalysisRegional DevelopmentLocal GovernancePolitical IncentivesPolicy EnvironmentPower StructurePrivate EconomyEconomic GrowthElite BargainingEmpirical Research

Summary

This book takes Zhejiang—one of China's richest provinces and home to a highly developed private economy—as its object of analysis. After examining the political logic behind Zhejiang's private-sector growth after 1949, it proposes a classic political-economy framework: where local political elites sit within the political power structure shaped by historical circumstances determines the differing attitudes and approaches they adopt toward developing the private economy as they maximize their own political interests. Elites dominant in politics, able to secure top-down protection and support from higher authorities, have weak incentives to promote private-sector growth; politically marginalized elites can only seek support downward from grassroots backers, and so adopt de facto property-rights protection to safeguard local private economic interests, exchanging this for grassroots political support that maximally consolidates their own political base.

Editor's review

Power Structure, Political Incentives, and Economic Growth is Professor Zhang Qi's major work, offering an in-depth political-economy analysis of China's transitional period grounded in Zhejiang's experience of private-sector development. Its core value lies in moving beyond describing the "Zhejiang model" to probe the institutional core, revealing the causal chain by which local power structures shape political incentives and ultimately affect economic performance. The author places the Zhejiang case within the broader context of China's political-economic transformation and explores the interplay among informal institutions, local elite networks, and formal policy. This analytical lens lifts the book beyond a narrow study of a local economy to become an important reference for understanding China's regional development disparities and political-economic logic.

Scholarly contribution: the book provides a micro-level foundation for how "political incentives" are constructed and operate. The author meticulously shows how local officials, under particular power structures, weigh political risk against economic gain and thus make different policy choices and development strategies. This analysis helps explain not only the success of Zhejiang's private economy but also offers a comparative framework for understanding other regions' development paths. Its use of concepts such as "clientelist ties," "policy experimentation," and "institutional flexibility" embodies the essence of political-economy analysis.

For readers, the book's value lies in its profound explanatory power for real-world phenomena. It helps us consider why, under similar macro-policy environments, different regions embark on markedly different development trajectories. Its rich empirical material and rigorous logical argumentation give its conclusions both solid grounding and intellectual resonance. Though focused on Zhejiang, its theoretical framework has considerable reach for observing China's overall state-economy interaction, central-local relations, and even other transitional economies. This is a work that admirably combines case depth with theoretical height.

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Reading tips

  1. Begin with the introduction and theoretical framework to grasp the author's core analytical concepts and main line of reasoning.
  2. While reading, compare the Zhejiang case with regions you know well to deepen your understanding of the theory's explanatory power.
  3. The book contains many political-science terms and details of local governance; supplement it with general histories of Chinese politics or economic transformation as background.

About the publisher

Truth & Wisdom Press China · Founded in 2006

Truth & Wisdom Press focuses on finance and economics, social sciences, and world history, with titles spanning economic theory, institutional and legal analysis, political governance, and historical narrative. Representative books include The Miracle of China: Development Strategy and Economic Reform (30th Anniversary Edition) by Lin Yifu, Cai Fang, and Li Zhou; Robert's Rules of Order (12th Edition) by Henry Robert; and Principles of National Economics, The Nazi Seizure of Power: The Experience of a Single German Town, and Local Government in Transition: Official Incentives and Governance (Second Edition). Its author and translator network includes the scholars above as well as Yuan Tianpeng and Sun Di, and documentary writers such as Patrick Radden Keefe. The press emphasizes both translated and original works, building a clear profile in economics textbooks and academic works, parliamentary-procedure reference books, and literary nonfiction. Its library holdings number 79 titles; public information is limited, and this introduction emphasizes the publishing profile reflected in those titles.

Contents

  1. 版权信息
  2. 主编的话
  3. 序
  4. 前言
  5. ABSTRACT
  6. 1 引论
  7. 1.1 问题的提出
  8. 1.2 浙江模式的特点
  9. 1.3 有关民营经济发展的相关理论和解释
  10. 1.4 本书的解释：一个政治经济学的观点
  11. 1.5 浙江模式和现象的理论意义
  12. 2 浙江的共产主义革命与1949年后的权力格局
  13. 2.1 浙江省的共产革命和本地政治精英的形成（1922—1949年）
  14. 2.2 浙江1949年后的政治布局和权力结构
  15. 2.3 20世纪50年代的权力零和博弈
  16. 附录 游击队县和非游击队县的变量构建
  17. 3 为什么黑夜中狗不叫？农业集体化中的基层反应和策略
  18. 3.1 20世纪50年代初的经济变局：从新民主主义到过渡时期的总路线
  19. 3.2 20世纪50年代的农业集体化：高层政治的迷雾与政策不确定性
  20. 3.3 浙江农村的群体性事件（I）：闹退社
  21. 3.4 浙江农村的群体性事件（II）：包产到户
  22. 附录 “闹退社”地区差异的计量检验
  23. 4 失意者们，团结起来：“文革”的“资本主义”复辟
  24. 4.1 从“大跃进”到“四清”：政治环境的变化和结果
  25. 4.2 “文革”中的权力游戏和地方干部的政治激励
  26. 4.3 “文革”对地方干部的政治激励效应及其经济效果
  27. 附录 对浙江各县“文革”期间武斗激烈程度的计量检验
  28. 5 具有浙江特色的经济发展：改革时代政治不确定性下的民营经济和基层创新
  29. 5.1 “文革”后浙江的政治走势和特点
  30. 5.2 政治不确定条件下的农业去集体化：1977—1982年间包产到户的蔓延和合法化
  31. 5.3 1976年后浙江企业家精神的迸发和民营企业的创业历程
  32. 6 结论和讨论I：浙江模式VS.江苏模式——兼论中国地方经济发展模式的形成和差异
  33. 6.1 江苏省的革命历史和地方权力结构的特点
  34. 6.2 江苏的“文革”和社队企业的发轫
  35. 6.3 历史冲击、地方权力结构和经济发展：关于江浙对比的几个可检验假说
  36. 7 结论和讨论II：权力结构、政商关系和民营经济的未来
  37. 7.1 宏观政治经济环境
  38. 7.2 政商利益交换：公共产品还是私人产品？
  39. 7.3 要素禀赋和技术变化
  40. 参考文献
  41. 后记

FAQ

What is the book's main argument? The core argument is that local power structures (such as the composition and stability of elite alliances) determine the nature of the political incentives local officials face; different incentives lead them to adopt different economic policies and development strategies. This is the key political-economy reason why Zhejiang's private economy flourished while other regions with similar conditions may have performed differently.
Do I need a strong background in economics or political science to understand it? This is an academic monograph using a political-economy framework; a foundation in social science (especially political science and economics) will aid comprehension. However, the author's account of the Zhejiang case is quite concrete, so even non-specialist readers can gain deep insight into the logic of local development in China.
Are the book's data and cases outdated? The book draws on the author's long-term fieldwork, with primary empirical material covering a key period of China's economic transformation. Although specific data may not be the most recent, the underlying logic it reveals—among power structure, incentives, and growth—has lasting explanatory power and remains highly relevant for understanding current local government behavior and economic interaction in China.

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About the author

章奇 Author

Public information about Zhang Qi is limited. What can be confirmed centers on his work in economics. His book Power Structure, Political Incentives and Economic Growth: A Political Economy Analysis Based on the Experience of Private Economic Development in Zhejiang appears in the Contemporary Economics Series, and another work is included in the Contemporary Economics Library; his works are commonly classified under finance and economics. Judging from his subjects, he examines the relationship between political structures and economic incentives, taking the development experience of Zhejiang's private economy as his object of analysis and using a political economy framework to discuss how institutional arrangements affect local economic growth. His writing tends to combine theoretical analysis with specific regional experience, supporting arguments with cases and carrying a strong academic research character. Both works belong to the field of economics, and his readership is mainly in finance, economics and the social sciences.